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THE PRAGMATIC INTERPRETATION OF
SECTION 16(b) AND THE NEED
FOR CLARIFICATION
HAL M. BATEMANO
Despite its ostensible simplicity and the general wholesomeness
of its stated purpose, section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
19341 has had both a litigious and a controversial history. Neverthe-
less, it has endured without statutory change for thirty-seven years.
Designed to prevent unfair use of corporate information by insiders
in short-swing, speculative trading in the securities of the company, this
provision makes all profits realized by such insiders from such trading
recoverable by the corporation. An expeditious suit to recover the
profits, which may be brought either by the corporation or by a share-
holder on its behalf, is expressly created by the section. In many of the
cases, the courts have been confronted with the need to interpret the
provisions of 16(b) in relation to a wide range of issues and trans-
actions. This has, in turn, frequently compelled the courts to consider
the basic principles and methods of interpretation to be used in re-
solving issues under the section.
It has been accurately observed that in the course of this inter-
pretive process there has been a distinct change in the method and
principles of interpretation used.2 In the early cases which interpreted
section 16(b) for the first time, the courts adopted an extremely literal
and often harsh interpretation of its provisions, which has since come
to be known as the objective method. For many years, this was the
generally accepted method of interpretation. In later cases which pre-
sented even more difficult issues, however, the courts gradually began
to move to a more pragmatic or subjective approach to the interpreta-
tion of 16(b), which has placed relatively more emphasis on the policy
of the statute and less on its literal terms. While this transition has
been taking place, there have also been important developments in
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia, School of Law. B.A., Rice
University, 1954; J.D., Southern Methodist University, 1956.
1 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
2 Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL
L. REv. 45 (1968). Mr. Lowenfels' distinguished article is an important analysis of this
development, to which the author is indebted. See also Painter, The Evolving Role of
Section 16(b), 62 MscH. L. REv. 649 (1964); Note, Stock Exchanges Pursuant to Corporate
Consolidation: A Section 16(b) "Purchase or Sale"?, 117 U. PA. L. Rav. 1034 (1969).
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related areas of the law - particularly the explosive developments
under SEC rule l0b-58-which may have influenced the courts in part.
As the inevitable consequence of these developments, greater un-
predictability and uncertainty have resulted in many cases with respect
to the applicability of section 16(b). Although most of the courts in
recent cases have accepted the newer pragmatic method of interpreta-
tion explicitly or implicitly, their handling of it has not been free of
difficulty. It is the purpose of this article to review in general outline
the transition which has occurred in the courts' approach in inter-
preting the section, to examine some of the recent cases which have
undertaken the application of the new pragmatic method of inter-
pretation, and to comment on the directions the courts should con-
sider in future cases.4
STRucruRE AND PURPOSE OF SECTION 16(b)
Both the liability and the remedy created by 16(b) are specified
in the statutory language:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer
by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by
him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any
equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was
acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously con-
tracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective
of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or
officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security
purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period
exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted
at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the
issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name
and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring
such suit within sixty days after the request or shall fail diligently
to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought
more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This
subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where
such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase
and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any
transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
4Since the Lowenfels article provides a thorough analysis of the development of
the new pragmatic method of interpretation, this will only be reviewed in broad outline
here. See Lowenfels, supra note 2.
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regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose
of this subsection.5
Insiders subject to the provision are defined in section 16(a) as
officers and directors of issuers which have an equity security registered
under section 12 of the Exchange Act8 and beneficial owners of more
than 10 percent of any such security. Liability extends to any profit
realized by an insider from any short-swing transaction in any equity
security of the issuer. Any combination of sale and purchase of such
security within less than six months of each other may be used to
establish both the profit realized and the short-swing transaction within
16(b), regardless of the sequence of transactions or the identity of shares,
since all shares of the same class are treated as fungible.7 A suit to
recover any such profit realized may be brought either by the corpora-
tion or by a security holder on its behalf, and in the latter event, gen-
erous attorney's fees are customarily allowed to the successful plaintiff.8
Due to section 27 of the Exchange Act, the federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction of suits under section 16(b), with liberal venue
and nationwide service of process. 9
The explicit statement of purpose in the opening lines of 16(b)
has given rise to some of the problems of interpretation. Obviously,
it is the general purpose of the section to prevent the unfair use of
corporate information by insiders in trading. But it is not clear from
the statute itself whether either access to or actual use of corporate
5 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
6 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1964). The section requires two groups of issuers to register their
securities: (1) issuers whose securities are listed on a national securities exchange, and
(2) any other issuers which have total assets exceeding $1,000,000, and a class of equity
security held of record by 500 or more persons, subject to a limited number of exemptions.
These corporations and their insiders are within section 16(b) of the Act by virtue of the
definitive provisions in section 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964). The terms "director" and
"equity security," which are key terms in both 16(a) and 16(b), are themselves defined in
§§ 3(a)(7) and (11), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(7) and (11) (1964). The term "officer" is defined in
SEC rule 3b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1970).
7"The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase, or
otherwise acquire." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1964).
"The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of."
§ 3(a)(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1964).
8 The policy reason behind this custom is to encourage the enforcement of the section.
This, like much else in the development of 16(b), had its origin in Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943), where the court in approv-
ing the award of a substantial attorney's fee to the successful plaintiff, stated: "Since
in many cases such as this the possibility of recovering attorney's fees will provide the
sole stimulus for the enforcement of section 16(b), the allowance must not be too nig-
gardly." Id. at 241. This has been criticized as undesirably champertous and an unwise
enforcement device. 2,5 L. Loss, SEcuRrris REGULATION 1051-55, 3017-21 (2d ed. 1961, Supp.
1969) [hereinafter Loss].
9 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
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information by the insider defendant is a necessary element in the
plaintiff's case. Since the remedy was clearly intended by the drafts-
men to be highly efficient and virtually automatic, with difficult prob-
lems of proof being reduced to a minimum,10 the courts have tradi-
tionally rejected any contention that either possession or use of inside
information need be shown. Nor has proof of the absence of any inside
information been regarded as a defense.1
On the other hand, the liability and the remedy created by sec-
tion 16(b) are limited to a specific abuse by corporate insiders of their
access to corporate information -namely, profiting from speculative
short-swing trading in the equity securities of the corporation. There
is no indication in the language of section 16(b) that the statement
at its outset concerning the general purpose to which it is related
should be used to expand the reach of the specific liability and remedy
it creates in an attempt to redress all abuses by insiders of their
corporate position. A more reasonable interpretation is that the section
was intended only to deal with short-swing speculative trading by in-
siders as one measure toward achieving the general goal of preventing
the unfair use of corporate information by insiders. The significance
of the determination of the purpose intended to be achieved by 16(b)
becomes more apparent after a review of the interpretive problems
which have been encountered by the courts.
EARLY CASES AND THE OBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION
The first decisions which dealt with the problem of interpreting
section 16(b) unequivocally adopted what has since become known as
the objective or literal method of interpretation. In these cases, the
courts concluded that the only issues to be determined were whether
the defendant was an insider subject to the section and whether he
had engaged in any combination of sale and purchase of an equity
security of the issuer within less than six months which, when matched,
indicated a profit. The plaintiff was neither required to show culpable
10 In hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency prior to enact-
ment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Mr. Thomas G. Corcoran, a principal drafts-
man of the Act and chief spokesman for it before Congress during its consideration,
testified with respect to section 16(b):
You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell the
security within 6 months after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove
the existence of such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude
rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove
that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a short swing.
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
78d Cong., 2d Sess. 6557 (1934); see also 2 Loss 1040-44.
lSee Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative
to "Burning Down the Barn to Kill the Rats," 52 CoNEmL L.Q. 69 (1966); 2 Loss 1040-44.
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intent on the part of the defendant nor that the defendant had actually
possessed inside information when he traded. These cases also held
that profit within the meaning of 16(b) was determined only by match-
ing the lowest purchase price with the highest sale price without re-
gard to either actual losses realized by the insider on other transactions
in the same security or to rules of tracing the identity shares or of
averaging purchase prices and sale prices. 12 In adopting this objective
method of interpretation, the courts used as a fulcrum the now famous
description of section 16(b) by Mr. Thomas G. Corcoran, chief spokes-
man for its draftsmen, as a "crude rule of thumb," although the rel-
atively narrow context in which this description was used has frequently
been overlooked. 13
The first of these early cases was Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.14 in
which the court not only held that section 16(b) was constitutional but
also disposed of two basic issues with respect to its interpretation. First,
the court rejected the use of any subjective standard of proof in actions
under the section which would require the plaintiff to show actual
unfair use of inside information as a prerequisite to the defendants'
liability. In explicit language, the court concluded that the opening
phrase of 16(b) merely states its general purpose and was not intended
to create any issue of fact in the cases. 15 Second, the court held that
12 To illustrate this method of determining "profit realized", assume that the insider
executes the following transactions in an equity security of the section 12 issuer in the
same year:
January 10-Buys 100 shares at $90.
February 10-Sells 100 shares at $75.
March 1-Buys 100 shares at $60.
April 1- Sells 100 shares at $20.
May 1-Buys 100 shares at $50.
May 15-Sells 100 shares at $40.
Although the insider might insist that he had actually realized a loss on every pair of
transactions in chronological sequence, with a total realized loss of $6,500, the tradi-
tional rule under 16(b) would hold that he was liable to the issuer for a "profit realized"
of $2,500, determined by matching the May 1 purchase at $50 with the February 10 sale
at $75 and disregarding all other transactions in the same period. Gratz v. Claughton, 187
F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d
231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
13 See note 10 supra. The comment seems clearly concerned only with the language in
16(b) which expressly excludes consideration of any issue of whether the insider intended
from the outset to complete the trading transactions within less than six months. See
Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 60-61.
14 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
15 Had Congress intended that only profits from an actual misuse of inside in-
formation should be recoverable, it would have been simple enough to say so.
Significantly, however, it makes recoverable the profit from any purchase and
sale, or sale and purchase, within the period. The failure to limit the recovery to
profits gained from misuse of information justifies the conclusion that the




"profit realized" within the meaning of the section was to be determined
by matching the highest sale price with the lowest purchase price among
the defendant's transactions in securities of the same class within any
period of less than six months. In this respect the court rejected the
defendants' arguments (1) that they were entitled to trace specific
shares through the identification of certificates used in purchases and
sales, (2) that the rule of first in, first out could be used to match pur-
chases and sales for 16(b) purposes, and (3) that the defendants could
use average purchase prices and average sale prices to reduce their
liability. The court concluded that
the statute was intended to be thoroughgoing, to squeeze all pos-
sible profits out of stock transactions, and thus to establish a stan-
dard so high as to prevent any conflict between the selfish interest
of a fiduciary officer, director, or stockholder and the faithful
performance of his duty.... The only rule whereby all possible
profits can be surely recovered is that of lowest price in, highest
price out - within six months - as applied by the district court.
We affirm it here, defendants having failed to suggest another
more reasonable rule.'0
A few years later, the same court in Gratz v. Claughton'7 dealt
further with the interpretation of "profit realized" and with the method
of profit computation to be used in 16(b) cases. Here, the court re-
affirmed the position taken in Smolowe based on the concept that all
shares of stock of the same class are fungible and held that the only
way to give full effect to the congressional purpose to squeeze all pos-
sible profits out of insider short-swing trading is to match the defen-
dant's lowest purchase prices with his highest sale prices in any two
transactions involving the same number of shares of the same class
within less than six months of each other. In addition, the court
refused to allow any recognition of offsetting losses realized by the
defendant on other transactions in the same security, to reduce the
profit recoverable under the section.'8
In the same era, the Second Circuit also decided Park & Tilford,
16 Id. at 239.
17 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951). The court again upheld
the constitutionality of the section and further held, that venue laid in any district where
any part of the 16(b) transaction occurred is proper.
18 Perhaps the disallowance of offsetting losses was the most stunning aspect of the
court's ruling. Under the method of computation required by the court, defendant
Claughton was liable for 16(b) profits of approximately $300,000. However, it appeared
that the defendant had actually suffered losses of over $400,000. Hence, the net detriment
to defendant Claughton, including both actual losses and 16(b) liability, was roughly
$700,000. See Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1959); 2 Loss 1063-64
(regarding the actual losses involved).
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Inc. v. Schulte"9 which, for the first time, presented the problem of the
applicability of 16(b) to transactions in convertible securities under
the literal or objective method of interpretation. Members of the
Schulte family, which dominated Park & Tilford, had converted their
shares of Park & Tilford convertible preferred into common stock and
had subsequently sold the common stock within six months after
the conversion date. The sale price of the common stock was well above
the value of the preferred or the common on the date of the conversion
and the Schultes were unquestionably 16(b) insiders. The principal
issue, which became increasingly important in subsequent cases, was
whether the conversion of the preferred stock had constituted a "pur-
chase" of the common stock received upon conversion. The court, in
unqualified language, held that it did:
[A] conversion of preferred into common stock followed by a sale
within six months is a "purchase and sale" within the statutory
language of Section 16(b). Whatever doubt might otherwise exist
as to whether a conversion is a "purchase" is dispelled by the defini-
don of "purchase" to include "any contract to buy, purchase, or
otherwise acquire" Section 3(a)(13). Defendants did not own the
common stock in question before they exercised their option to
convert; they did afterward. Therefore they acquired the stock,
within the meaning of the Act. The Act certainly applies as well
to executed acquisitions as to executory contracts to acquire. Not
otherwise could the Act accomplish the Congressional purpose to
protect the outside stockholders against at least short-swing specu-
lation by insiders with advance information.20
The unyieldingly literal or objective method of interpretation
established in these famous early cases became the generally accepted
one and was followed in numerous subsequent cases to reach similar
results. As a consequence, 16(b) became widely regarded as "arbitrary",
"Draconian", "a trap for the unwary", and "probably the most cordially
disliked provision in all these statutes from the point of view of those
whom it affects. ' 21 It is perhaps significant, however, that at the time
this severe method of interpretation was becoming established, there
was relatively little else in the law to restrain corporate insiders in
the use of their special access to corporate information to their private
advantage in securities transactions. The judicial development under
rule lOb-5 was in its infancy, and state law varied widely in effective-
19 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
20 Id. at 987.
21 See W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 36 (1968); 2 Loss 1087-90;
Munter, supra note 11.
[Vol. 45:772
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ness and presented substantial procedural problems. Hence, section
16(b) represented by far the most effective means available to the
courts to restrain insider trading with access to corporate information.
This fact may have contributed to the severity of the method of in-
terpretation which the courts adopted.
EVOLUTION OF THE PRAGMATIC METHOD OF INTERPRETATION
Although the objective method became widely accepted, it soon
began to be challenged as the courts were confronted with more
difficult issues in novel situations. This was probably due in part to
the unusually litigious enforcement mechanism built into 16(b)22
and in part to the increasing popularity of convertible securities and
options. In dealing with these problems, the courts began to recognize
the necessity to consider the section's basic purposes in order to
determine whether a particular case presented the possibility of the
type of abuse which 16(b) was intended to prevent. In many cases,
this became the central issue. In time, this subjective pragmatic method
of interpretation has become accepted by most courts with respect to
many of the issues in section 16(b) cases.2 3 This has allowed for a more
just result in many instances. But it has also created greater uncertainty
and unpredictability, and occasionally it has produced surprising
results.
Perhaps the first intimation that a more flexible approach to
16(b) interpretation was possible was the suggestion by Judge Learned
Hand in his concurring opinion in Rattner v. Lehman.24 The issue
before the court was whether the individual defendant, Hertz, who
was both a director of a corporation registered under section 12 and
a partner in Lehman Brothers, which had realized short-swing profits
from trading in the corporation's stock was liable under section 16(b)
for all of Lehman Brothers' profits, or whether in the alternative, his
partners might be considered directors for 16(b) purposes. The court
held that Hertz alone came within the statutory definition of director
and was liable only for his share of the firm's profit. Judge Hand,
while agreeing with this result on these particular facts, was unwilling
to concede that it would not be possible on appropriate facts for the
partnership and its members to be deemed directors within 16(b) if
22 This device has been criticized as champertous. See 2 Loss 1041-42, 1051-55, 1090;
Hamilton, Convertible Securities and Section 16(b): The End of an Era, 44 TmXAs L. REv.
1447, 1450 (1966). Professor Loss urges administrative enforcement instead. 5 Loss 3017-
21.
23 See Lowenfels, supra note 2.
24 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).
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one of the partners had in fact been deputized by the firm to sit on
the board of directors. 25
A similar approach to interpreting the section was used in Blau
v. Mission Corp.26 The defendant, Mission Corporation, owned more
than 10 percent of the common stock of Tide Water Associated Oil
Company, which was registered under 12(g) of the Exchange Act. On
two occasions, the defendant had transferred its Tide Water shares to a
subsidiary of the defendant in exchange for stock of the subsidiary
However, between the time of the first exchange and the time of the
second exchange the common stock of the subsidiary had been distrib-
uted to the public and listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The
court distinguished the two exchanges between the defendant and its
subsidiary on the basis that when the first exchange occurred, the
defendant owned all of the subsidiary's stock and the transfer was
therefore, "a mere transfer between corporate pockets, ' 27 but that
when the second exchange occurred, the shares of the subsidiary re-
ceived by the defendant had a public market. The court concluded,
therefore, that the second exchange was a "sale" within the meaning of
section 16(b), while the first was not, reasoning that "[t]o hold other-
wise would be to place entirely undue stress on the corporate fiction
reaching harsh and wooden results quite unnecessary to achieve the
purposes of the act."'28
Based on the approach it had taken in Mission Corp., the Second
Circuit later in the same year decided Roberts v. Eaton,29 in which it
held that a reclassification of common stock into common and pre-
ferred through amendment of the articles of incorporation was not
a "purchase" of the new stock within 16(b). After examining various
factors pointing to this result, the court concluded:
[I]"t seems quite possible that no one of the factors we have enu-
merated, standing alone, would be sufficient for that result. But
in cumulative effect we think they are. The reclassification at bar
could not possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed by
Section 16(b). This being so, it was not a "purchase" and the deci-
sion below was correct.30
25 1 agree that section 16(b) does not go so far; but I wish to say nothing as to
whether, if a firm deputed a partner to represent its interests as a director on the
board, the other partners would not be liable. True, they would not even then be
formally "directors"; but I am not prepared to say that they could not be so con-
sidered; for some purposes the common law does treat a firm as a jural person.
Id. at 566-67 (Hand, J., concurring).
26 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954).
27 Id. at 80.
28 Id. (emphasis added).
29 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954).
30 Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
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Although these cases presented some departure from strict literal-
ism in 16(b) interpretation, the major evolution of the pragmatic or
subjective method of interpretation occurred in a series of later cases
which struggled with the problems presented by convertible securi-
ties. 1 The fundamental issues in these cases were whether conversion of
the convertible security into the underlying security constitute a "sale"
of the convertible security and a "purchase" of the underlying security
within the meaning of the section. Literally interpreted, 16(b) coupled
with the definitions of "purchase" and "sale" in section 3,32 seemed to
require an affirmative answer to both questions. This was reinforced by
the decision in Park & Tilford. But the courts were confronted with the
fact that this could easily produce absurdly harsh and unjust results,
unnecessary to the accomplishment of the basic purpose of 16(b).
The first of these cases was Ferraiolo v. Newman33 in which Judge
(now Mr. Justice) Potter Stewart, writing for the Sixth Circuit, after
examining earlier decisions, concluded that "[t]he standard that
emerges from these decisions can be simply stated: Every transaction
which can reasonably be defined as a purchase will be so defined, if
the transaction is of a kind which can possibly lend itself to the specu-
lation encompassed by Section 16(b)."34 Applying this standard, Judge
Stewart decided that on the facts of the case before him the defen-
dant's conversion of convertible preferred into common stock did not
constitute a "purchase" of the common stock within the meaning of
16(b).
The next major decision in this group was Blau v. Max Factor
Co.35 in which members of the family which controlled the corporate
issuer exchanged their common stock pursuant to a conversion right
for substantially similar class A stock which had a public market. Within
less than six months thereafter the class A stock received in the ex-
change was sold to the public. The Ninth Circuit held that on the
facts of this case the conversion did not constitute a purchase of the
class A stock for the purposes of 16(b). To reach this result the court
explicitly embraced the pragmatic method of interpretation of 16(b)
in the following language:
Thus, a transaction is held to be a "purchase" within Section 16(b)
"if in any way it lends itself to the accomplishment of what the
31 Since this development has been carefully analyzed elsewhere, it will only be given
summary treatment here. See W. PAiNTER, supra note 21, at 42-52; Hamilton, supra note
22.
32 See note 7 supra.
83 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 US. 927 (1959).
34 Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
85 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 82 US. 892 (1965).
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statute is designed to prevent".... On the other hand, to avoid
purposeless harshness, a transaction is held not to be a Section
16(b) "purchase" if it "was not one that could have lent itself to
the practices which Section 16(b) was enacted to prevent."386
That this approach to 16(b) interpretation was neither predictable
nor unanimously accepted became apparent in the decision the same
year by the Third Circuit in Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster.37 There, the
court reviewed the earlier cases, flatly rejected the developing pragmatic
method of interpretation and reaffirmed the objective interpretation. It
concluded, therefore, that the conversion of convertible debentures into
common stock constituted both a "sale" of the debentures and a "pur-
chase" of the common stock, within the meaning of 16(b), both of which
might be used to produce a profit recoverable under the section. The
importance of this decision, however, was limited by the fact that
the court was badly divided,38 and by two major decisions the following
year in the Second and the Eighth Circuits, both of which accepted the
pragmatic view.
The major issue which confronted the Second Circuit in Blau v.
Lamb39 was whether the conversion of convertible preferred into com-
mon stock constituted a "sale" of the preferred within the meaning of
section 16(b). The court, adopting the pragmatic approach, concluded
that the preferred and the common were in fact economic equivalents
and therefore, that the conversion should not be construed as a "sale"
of the preferred. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that prior
decisions did not require it to treat the conversion as a sale regardless
of analysis and that
[i]nstead, most of the appellate decisions, including the more
recent decisions of our court, state that the application of Section
16(b) depends upon whether the transaction in question could tend
to accomplish what the section was designed to prevent .... Con-
gress adopted the sweeping, arbitrary regulatory mechanism em-
bodied in Section 16(b) in order to insure that even the possibility
of insider abuse was deterred, but it would seem to follow that in
order to avoid "purposeless harshness" a court should first inquire
whether a given transaction could possibly tend to accomplish the
practices Section 16(b) was to prevent .... In some cases, however,
this initial inquiry will convince a court that the conversion trans-
action in question could not possibly have lent itself to insider
36 Id. at 307.
37 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
38 The case was decided by a panel of eight judges of the Third Circuit, only four
of whom joined in the majority opinion.
89 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 US. 1002 (1967).
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abuse. In such a case it is not inconsistent with Section 16(b)'s
regulatory mechanism to hold that the section does not apply.40
The Eighth Circuit followed suit in Petteys v. Butler 1 in which
it held that under the particular circumstances the conversion of
convertible preferred stock into common stock did not constitute a
"purchase" of the common within the meaning of 16(b). In reaching
this result, the court discussed the development of the pragmatic method
of interpretation in the foregoing cases and concluded that
notwithstanding the broad language in the Park 0& Tilford case
and ruling in Hell-Coil Corporation v. Webster, we believe the
rule has been clearly established by a majority of the circuits,
that each case must be examined on its own particular facts. If,
from an examination of the particular facts, a transaction is of a
kind that can possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed
by Section 16(b) and falls within the broad definitions of "pur-
chase" and "sale," it will be so defined. However, if an examina-
tion of the facts indicates that there is no possibility of abuse,
there is no need to apply a Section 16(b) label to the transaction.
... A facet to consider as militating against painting every con-
ceivable conversion with the same broad brush, regardless of
the lack of opportunity for short-swing market manipulation, is
the manifestly absurd and unfair result that can flow from such
a per se black-letter rubric.4
Most of the problems relating to convertible securities and
section 16(b) have ultimately been resolved by rule 16b-9.43 However,
the development in these cases of a new pragmatic approach to 16(b)
interpretation to the point of general acceptance by several major
circuits continues to have pivotal importance with respect to the
interpretation of 16(b). It should also be noted that in dealing with
option agreements to buy or sell equity securities registered under sec-
tion 12, the courts have experienced similar difficulties in interpreting
16(b) and have attempted to use the pragmatic method of interpretation.
In these cases, however, the courts have tended to devote less attention
to the broad principles of interpretation and more to analysis of the
particular facts of the case. Hence, these cases reflect a degree of
uncertainty on the part of the courts in handling the pragmatic
method of interpretation in novel and unusual situations.44 It is clear,
40 Id. at 519.
41367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
421d. at 535-36. It is interesting to note that Judge (now Mr. Justice) Blackmun
dissented vigorously. See id. at 538.
43 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9 (1970); see also Hamilton, supra note 22.
44 See, e.g., Miller v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 337 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964);
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however, that in these cases the courts have accepted the general
principle of a more pragmatic interpretation of section 16(b).
In most of the foregoing cases, the courts were deciding whether
the particular transaction presented fell within 16(b). In these cases,
the court's use of the pragmatic interpretation enabled them to avoid
senseless harshness in transactions which did not reasonably lend
themselves to the abuses 16(b) was designed to prevent. Thus, in
these cases the pragmatic approach tended to relieve some defendants
of 16(b) liability. In contrast to this line of cases, the most significant
contribution to the development of the pragmatic method may have
come from the opposite direction.
Based upon the suggestion of Judge Hand's concurring opinion
in Rattner, Lehman Brothers, a partnership, was again sued as a
director under 16(b) on the basis of the deputization theory in Blau
v. Lehman.45 Thomas, a member of the partnership, had been a
member of the board of directors of Tide Water Associated Oil Com-
pany during a period in which Lehman Brothers had realized short-
swing profits in Tide Water stock. In a suit under 16(b) against both
Lehman Brothers and Thomas, one of the key issues was whether the
partnership itself should be deemed a "director" of Tide Water for
16(b) purposes. Based on fact-findings in the trial court, which had
been affirmed by the Second Circuit, that "there was no evidence
that the firm of Lehman Brothers deputed Thomas to represent its
interests as Director on the board of Tide Water,"46 the United States
Supreme Court held that Lehman Brothers was not a "director" within
section 16(b). However, the Court stated:
No doubt Lehman Brothers, though a partnership, could for pur-
poses of Section 16 be a "director" of Tide Water and function
through a deputy, since Section 3(a)(9) of the Act provides that
"'person' means ... partnership" and Section 3(a)(7) that "'direc-
tor' means any director of a corporation or any person performing
similar functions with respect to any organization, whether incor-
porated or unincorporated." Consequently Lehman Brothers would
be a "director" of Tide Water, if as petitioner's complaint charged
Lehman actually functioned as a director through Thomas, who
had been deputized by Lehman to perform a director's duties not
for himself but for Lehman.4 7
Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965);
B.T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1964); Volk v. Zlotoff, 318 F. Supp.
864 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
45368 U.S. 403 (1962).
46 Id. at 407.
47 Id. at 409-10.
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Thus, without expressly adopting the broad statements of the
pragmatic method found in many of the cases discussed above, the
Court has, in effect, recognized a pragmatic method of expanding
section 16(b) to reach parties not normally thought to be within its
scope, where necessary to achieve the purposes of the section. While the
Court did not go as far in this direction as it was urged to,48 there
is in its decision a distinct departure from the strictly objective, literal
method of interpretation found in the earlier cases.49
Although not relied upon in any of the decisions in which the
pragmatic method of interpretation was being developed, it is signifi-
cant that this development was being reinforced by contemporaneous
developments in parallel areas of the law. 0 Among other things, the
1964 amendments to the securities acts5l substantially enlarged the base
upon which section 16(b) operates. The addition of section 12(g) to the
Exchange Act52 increased greatly the number of corporations subject
to section 12 and the number of insiders subject to section 16.3 As
a result, injustice or harshness in the interpretation of 16(b) must
today affect a much larger number of persons and transactions than
before. Moreover, there have been the explosive judicial develop-
ments under rule lOb-5. This widely noted and analyzed development
has become a major aspect of the contemporary law of insider respon-
sibility with respect to corporate information and to transactions in
the corporation's securities.5 4 Thus, it is no longer true that 16(b) stands
as the exclusive federal remedy to prevent the abuse by insiders of
corporate position and information. If the courts in the early cases
felt the need to expand 16(b) to its limits because little else was
48 The SEC as amicus curiae and Mr. Justice Douglas urged the Court to hold
Lehman Brothers subject to section 16(b) on policy grounds due to their potential access
to inside information. See id. at 414-20 (dissenting opinion).
49 See also Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(deputization recognized as a possibility, but not found to exist in fact).
50 See Lowenfels, supra note 2.
51 Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565.
52 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1964).
53 Since 1966, section 12(g) has required every corporation which has total assets
exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of equity security held of record by 500 or more persons
(subject to a limited number of exemptions) to register such security with the SEC.
Prior to the 1964 amendments, only companies with securities listed for trading on a
national securities exchange were subject to sections 12 and 16. The number of corpo-
rations brought under section 16 by the addition of section 12(g) is substantial.
54 See generally A. BROMBERG, SECuRITIEs LAW: FRAUD -SEC RULE lOb-5 (1967); 3
Loss 1448-74, 1763-97; W. PAINTER, supra note 21, at 97-316. There are innumerable ex-
cellent articles on the many aspects of the rule and the case law development. Un-
doubtedly, the major decision to date in this area relating to insiders and the access to
undisclosed corporate information is SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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available to redress insider abuse of corporate information, they need
no longer feel that necessity, and a more reasonable interpretation of
the section is in order. Adding further support to this conclusion are
important new developments in parallel areas of state law.55
RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE PRAGMATIC INTERPRETATION OF SECTION
16(b) AND THE PROBLEM OF PREDIeTABILiTY
Although most of the circuits which have considered the question
have accepted the idea of a more pragmatic method of interpreting
section 16(b), this has not ended the problems, as demonstrated by
four of the more recent decisions. These cases have also made it clear
that the pragmatic method works both ways. While some, who ap-
pear to fall within the literal ambit of 16(b) may be excused because,
to hold them would not further the true purposes of the section, others,
who appear to be literally outside its reach, may be brought within it
by the same method of interpretation for similar reasons.
Three years after its decision in Lamb, the Second Circuit decided
Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.,"" in which the central issue was
whether Martin Marietta Corporation could be considered a director of
Sperry Rand Corporation for 16(b) purposes on the basis of deputiza-
tion. George M. Bunker, the president and chief executive officer of
Martin Marietta, had served as a director of Sperry Rand from April
29 to August 1, 1963 when he resigned. During this time, Martin
Marietta had purchased 101,300 shares of Sperry Rand stock which
it sold between August 29 and September 6, 1963 following Bunker's
resignation but less than six months after its purchase. The plaintiff
contended that Bunker had represented Martin Marietta when he
served as a member of the Speny Rand board and that Martin Mari-
etta, therefore, was a "director" of Sperry Rand within 16(b) during
that time. The trial court agreed that the deputization theory was valid
under Blau v. Lehman, thus accepting a pragmatic interpretation, but
held on conflicting evidence, that Bunker had not in fact been depu-
tized by Martin Marietta57
The Second Circuit agreed as to the validity of the deputization
theory and the pragmatic method of interpreting 16(b), stating that
[t]he judicial tendency, especially in this circuit, has been to in-
terpret Section 16(b) in ways that are most consistent with the
55See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 201 N.Y.S.2d 78
(1969); cf. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1969).
56406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 808 (1970).
67286 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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legislative purpose, even departing where necessary from the
literal statutory language.... But the policy underlying the enact-
ment of Section 16(b) does not permit an expansion of the statute's
scope to persons other than directors, officers, and 10%o share-
holders. s
However, the court disagreed as to the interpretation of the conflicting
evidence in this case, and reversed, holding that Bunker had in fact
been the deputy or representative of Martin Marietta on the Sperry
Rand board, and that Martin Marietta was, therefore, a "director"
within the meaning of section 16(b).O Furthermore, the liability was
held to extend to transactions completed by the sales after Bunker's
resignation, which were within less than six months of the purchases
during his directorship. 60
While this case is quite significant as the first 16(b) case actually
finding deputization to exist in fact, it is significant for present pur-
poses for two other reasons. First, it has used the pragmatic interpre-
tation to determine whether the defendant is an insider for 16(b)
purposes, whereas most earlier pragmatic cases were. concerned with
whether the transaction in question fell within the purposes of the
section. Second, the pragmatic interpretation is used in this case to
enlarge rather than to restrict, the scope of liability to further the
purposes of 16(b). On both of these questions, this case lends important
support to the wider acceptance and use of the pragmatic method and
is consistent with the policy expressed in the earlier pragmatic cases.
Slightly more than a year later, the Second Circuit decided New-
mark v. RKO General, Inc."1 which grew out of a 1967 corporate
acquisition. RKO General controlled Frontier Airlines through owner-
ship of 56 percent of its outstanding common stock. In April 1967, the
management of Frontier and that of Central Airlines reached a pro-
visional agreement for merger of the two companies. On May 3 or 4,
1967, RKO General contracted conditionally with several large Central
Airline shareholders to purchase a majority interest in Central stock
at $8.50 per share. The following day, the proposed merger of Central
into Frontier was publicly announced. Several contingencies precedent
to the consummation of both the merger and the stock purchase agree-
ment were satisfied between May and September 1967. On September
18, 1967, the stock purchase agreement was consummated and the
58 405 F.2d at 262.
59 Id. at 263-66. The court of appeals necessarily held that the district court's de-
termination of the fact issue was clearly erroneous under FEm. R. Crv. P. 52(a).
60 406 F.2d at 266-69.
61 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
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merger agreement, previously approved by a majority of the share-
holders of Central and Frontier, was filed. The issuance and exchange
of Frontier stock for the outstanding Central stock pursuant to the
terms of the merger occurred on October 1.
On behalf of Central Airlines, the plaintiff contended that RKO
General became an owner of more than 10 percent of the equity
securities of Central under the May purchase agreement, and that
the exchange of these Central shares for Frontier shares through the
merger within less than six months constituted a "sale" within the
meaning of section 16(b). The court of appeals, affirming the lower
court, held for the plaintiff on all issues. With respect to the interpreta-
tion of 16(b) the court observed:
The phrase [describing the section as "a crude rule of thumb"] now
serves to describe not only the statute but also one approach to its
application. Under the "objective" or "rule of thumb" approach,
the statute is applied to all transactions which seem to fall within
its terms, without regard to whether the imposition of liability
would further the purposes of the statute .... We have rejected
this interpretation.., in favor of the more "pragmatic" approach
of applying the statute only to those situations subject to specu-
lative manipulation.62
The court then held that "[t]he threshold issue raised on this appeal
is whether the purchase and subsequent exchange of Central shares
lent itself to the type of speculative abuse which section 16(b) was
designed to prevent."6 3 On the facts before it, the court commented
that the contract to purchase Central stock was "a classic example of
trading while in the possession of information unavailable to the
general public" and that "RKO was in an ideal position to take
speculative advantage" of the subsequent rise in the market price of
Central stock. 64 The court, based on its analysis of the transaction,
therefore concluded that
the purchase and subsequent exchange of Central shares were
fraught with the opportunities for the kind of speculative abuse
section 16(b) was intended to abort. RKO's success in fixing the
purchase price before the proposed merger became public knowl-
edge opened the door to possible speculative gains. Its ability to
determine whether and when the merger would be consummated
enabled it to maximize these gains or, at the very least, to avoid
any loss.65
62 Id. at 351 n.2.
63 Id. at 353.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 354.
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Having thus answered the threshold question, the court held
that the exchange of the Central shares through the merger constituted
a "sale" for 16(b) purposes, notwithstanding RKO's vigorous contention
that its relative ownership position in the overall business enterprise
was the same before and after the merger and was therefore unaffec-
ted by the merger, and that the exchange in the merger came within
the doctrine of economic equivalence announced in Lamb. The court
also affirmed the decision by the lower court adding 15 percent to the
recovery representing the control premium which had been realized
by RKO. In both of these holdings, the court relied heavily on the
fact that the exchange of shares in the merger involved stock in
two different corporations, despite the fact that they were two parts
of the same overall enterprise controlled by RKO General, rather
than two economically equivalent classes of stock in the same corpora-
tion, as was the case in Lamb.
Whether the court has correctly interpreted the applicability of
Lamb is debatable. On the one hand, the case represents the most
express effort to date to utilize the pragmatic interpretation in a very
different factual context. On the other hand, the court seems to have
rejected the application of economic equivalence to the facts in this
case on the strength of a highly formalistic distinction, which more
nearly resembles the reasoning and results in cases using the traditional
objective method of interpretation.
In a different context, the Seventh Circuit recently made effec-
tive use of the pragmatic method of interpretation to impose 16(b)
liability in Bershad v. McDonough.66 The defendants, husband and
wife, on March 15 and 16, 1967, purchased at $6.75 per share more
than 10 percent of the common stock of Cudahy Company, which was
registered under section 12. On July 20, 1967, the defendants entered
into a formal option agreement with Smelting Refining and Mining
Company, which granted Smelting the right to purchase the bulk of
the defendants' stock in Cudahy on or before October 1, 1967, at
$9.00 per share. Smelting paid the defendants $350,000 for the option,
which was to be applied against the purchase price, if the option was
exercised. Smelting was also granted an irrevocable proxy to vote the
stock subject to the option until October 1, 1967. On July 25, 1967,
its representatives were substituted for the defendants as members
of the Cudahy board of directors. The option was exercised and the
sale of defendants' stock to Smelting was closed in late September 1967,
slightly more than six months after defendants' purchase.
66 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970).
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The court of appeals, affirming a summary judgment for the
plaintiff, held that for 16(b) purposes, the option granted to Smelting
in July 1967, and the circumstances surrounding it constituted a "sale"
of the defendants' stock at that time and within less than six months
after their purchases in March 1967. The argument that the option did
not constitute a sale under West Virginia law until it was exercised was
rejected by the court:
[U]nder Section 3(a)(14) of the Act . . . the "sales" covered by
Section 16(b) are broadly defined to include "any contract to sell
or otherwise dispose of" any security .... Construction of these
terms is a matter of federal law . . . and "[w]hatever the terms
'purchase' and 'sale' may mean in other contexts," they should be
construed in a manner which will effectuate the purposes of the
specific section of the Act in which they are used. SEC v. National
Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 .... Applying this touchstone,
courts have generally concluded that a transaction falls within the
ambit of Section 16(b) if it can reasonably be characterized as a
"purchase" or "sale" without doing violence to the language of the
statute, and if the transaction is of a kind which can possibly lend
itself to the speculation encompassed by Section 16(b). . . The
phrase "any purchase and sale" in Section 16(b) is therefore not
to be limited or defined solely in terms of commercial law of sales
and notions of contractual rights and duties.67
The court also observed that in this case the option to Smelting was
ultimately exercised and had been obtained by a substantial advance
payment, and that Smelting had obtained irrevocable proxies and
representation on the board of directors at the time the option was
granted. Hence, the circumstances surrounding the granting of the
option indicated that its later exercise was, in fact, a foregone con-
clusion.
In this case, the court has again used the pragmatic interpretation
to enlarge rather than to reduce the apparent scope of liability in
order to prevent circumvention of the purposes of 16(b). On the
facts presented by the case, the court's use of the pragmatic method
appears substantially consistent with the section's purposes. The
troublesome fact that the option in question was apparently that
of the purchaser and not that of the defendant, which would seem to
militate against the result reached, is apparently satisfied by the
court's factual determination that the exercise of the option was all
but certain from the time it was granted.
A similar but more complex set of facts was involved in Abrams
67 Id. at 696-97.
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v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,.8 which grew out of the competitive
efforts of two corporations to acquire the Kern County Land Company.
In early 1967, Occidental sought a merger with Kern but was rebuffed.
On May 10, 1967, Occidental, through a tender offer, acquired more
than 10 percent of the outstanding Kern stock to strengthen its case
for a merger. As a defensive tactic, however, Kern promptly negotiated
a merger agreement with a subsidiary of Tenneco. Consequently,
on June 2, 1967, Occidental entered into an agreement with the
Tenneco subsidiary under which Occidental granted the subsidiary
an option to purchase the Tenneco preference stock which Occidental
would receive in the proposed merger as a shareholder in Kern. Al-
though less than clear from the opinion, the option was apparently
that of Tenneco. However, its exercise by Tenneco may have been
assumed from the outset. On July 17, 1967, the Kern shareholders
approved the proposed merger without dissent from Occidental, and
on August 30, 1967, the merger was consummated and the Tenneco
preference stock issued. Occidental made several unsuccessful attempts
to delay the merger until six months after its purchases of Kern stock.
It deferred the exchange of its Kern stock for the Tenneco preference
stock until December 11, 1967, at which time it immediately closed
under the option agreement with Tenneco.
In a consolidation of four actions under section 16(b) against
Occidental, the Southern District Court of New York held for the
plaintiffs, apparently basing its decision on the pragmatic method of
interpretation. In an early fact-finding, the court stated that
at least [two] alternatives [available to Occidental] . . . would
present the possibility for speculative abuse by Occidental of its
position in Old Kern, as that term is understood within the purview
and intendment of Section 16(b). Apart from the abuse of inside
information, which is presumed to exist under the statute, the
possibilities of abuse in the factual context of this case can read-
ily be envisaged. For example, Occidental could have used inside
information to enable it to decide whether or not to fight the
merger or sell its stock. Indeed Occidental elected to enter into the
option agreement.69
Although the opinion is vague in some respects as to its interpretation
of 16(b) in this situation, the court holds, in effect, that the option
agreement on June 2 and the consummation of the merger on August
68 CCH FE. SEc. L. REP. 92,875 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1970).
69 Id. at 90,273.
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30 resulted in a 16(b) "sale" of the Kern stock acquired by Occidental
in May at the price established in the option agreement. It is not
entirely clear whether the court is holding that the Kern stock was
sold in the August 30 merger at a price established in the June 2 op-
tion, or is holding that the stock purchased in May was disposed of
on June 2, on the theory that the Tenneco preference stock was the
economic equivalent of the Kern stock and that the purchase of one
stock and the sale of its economic equivalent within less than six
months falls under 16(b). In either event, the court was not deterred
from imposing 16(b) liability because the closing under the option
agreement was delayed until December- more than six months
after the purchases.
ANALYSIS
The transition in the methods used by the courts in interpreting
the provisions of section 16(b) leaves three basic questions, which
should be considered at this point: (1) Is the pragmatic method of
interpreting 16(b) justified, or should the courts be urged to return to
the traditional objective method of interpretation? (2) If the pragmatic
method of interpretation is accepted, what is the basic purpose and
intent of section 16(b), by which the courts should be guided in decid-
ing cases under the pragmatic method of interpretation? (3) Should the
pragmatic method of interpretation be used by the courts in dealing
with all of the issues presented by 16(b), or should it be limited to the
types of issues to which it has previously been applied?
With respect to the first question, it is submitted that, despite
the increased risk of unpredictability in 16(b) cases, the pragmatic
method of interpretation is preferable in principle to the objective
method originally adopted by the courts. The pragmatic method
obviously allows a court greater flexibility to interpret in a particular
situation to achieve a maximum degree of both justness in result
and fulfillment of the policy underlying section 16(b). This, of course,
is what creates greater unpredictability in outcome. However, it also
allows courts to avoid the arbitrariness and purposeless harshness in
particular cases, which has frequently been associated with decisions
under the objective method of interpretation. On the other hand,
the pragmatic method also gives the courts greater flexibility to
include within 16(b)'s reach a variety of situations which actually
come within its purposes, but, which are structured to allow technical
arguments to the effect that they do not fall within its literal pro-
visions. The best illustrations of this use of the pragmatic method are
[Vol. 45:772
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the cases which have developed the deputization theory and those
which deal with option agreements allowing an insider to freeze short-
swing profits without actually completing a sale within less than six
months of the purchase.
In addition, the pragmatic method of interpreting section 16(b)
guided by its essential purpose has also received the implicit support of
the Supreme Court in Blau v. Lehman, although the Court did not
comment directly on the method of interpretation. The legislative
history of the section is not conclusive in favor of either the objective
or the pragmatic method of interpretation, but lends adequate support
to the policy-guided pragmatic method to prevent the objective method
from being regarded as mandated by Congress." It seems clear that
the now famous "crude rule of thumb" description by Mr. Corcoran
expressly referred only to the fact that 16(b) explicitly eliminated any
requirement that the plaintiff prove the subjective intent of the in-
sider to engage in a short-swing transaction. To relieve the plaintiff of
this burden of proof is understandably necessary to the efficiency of
suits under 16(b). But this does not require - nor apparently did Mr.
Corcoran regard it as requiring -that courts should give no consid-
eration to the policies or purposes of section 16(b) or to the type of
transactions it was actually intended to deal with. Hence, the objective
method of interpretation adopted originally by the courts in part on
the strength of the "crude rule of thumb" description was probably
an exaggeration of Mr. Corcoran's intent.
Finally, it is also significant that the courts in the early cases
were faced with fairly clear short-swing speculation by corporate
insiders of the sort intended to be covered by 16(b). It was not until
later that the courts began to be faced with the more difficult inter-
pretive issues in less obvious cases. Hence, the pragmatic method of
interpretation, which has apparently been accepted in most of the
recent cases and particularly in the Second Circuit, should no longer
be regarded as suspect because of the strong language in the original
decisions supporting the objective method. On the contrary, the
pragmatic method should now be regarded as the leading and most
legitimate method of interpretation.
This conclusion, however, leads to consideration of the second
basic question outlined above. If the courts are to be guided by the
policy and purpose of 16(b) in interpreting its scope, a clear and pre-
70 W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoapoRAToNs 826 (4th unabr. ed. 1969); Hamil-
ton, supra note 22, at 1457 n.43; Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 59-61; see generally Hearings,
supra note 10, at 6463-6581.
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cise definition of the policy and purpose of the section is essential.
Too frequently the cases adopting the pragmatic method have given
scant attention to this problem. Instead, they have typically left
the question with broad, inconclusive statements that 16(b) is to be
interpreted to include within its provisions every transaction which
"is of a kind which can possibly lend itself to the speculation encom-
passed by section 16(b)," 71 or which "in any way... lends itself to the
accomplishment of what the statute is designed to prevent." 72 In part,
the unpredictability which has resulted from the use of the pragmatic
method in several of the recent cases is attributable to the fact that
the courts have been satisfied with very general conclusory statements
of this sort, without adequately determining exactly what the intended
purpose and scope of the section is.
The necessity for determining this working principle of the
pragmatic interpretation was clearly recognized by the Ninth Circuit
in the Max Factor case, where the court stated:
The initial inquiry must therefore be: What is the purpose
of Section 16(b)-what practices is the statute designed to pre-
vent?
As Section 16(b) itself states, its general purpose is to preclude
the "unfair use of information which may have been obtained by"
corporate insiders, in trading in the securities of their corporation.
But Congress did not seek to accomplish the whole of this purpose
by Section 16(b) alone. Section 16(b) creates a special remedy, ap-
plicable only in a limited situation. Absolute liability is imposed,
but only when the insider both acquires and disposes of securities
of his corporation "within any period of less than six months."
When acquisition and disposition are separated by a longer period
Section 16(b) is inapplicable; other remedies are then available, but
only upon proof of actual wrongdoing.
The fact that Section 16(b) was intended to apply only to
insider "short-term speculative swings" is confirmed by legislative
history, and has been often remarked by the courts.
The reasons which lead Congress to declare insider profits on
stock transactions forfeit only when purchase and sale both oc-
curred within less than six months, though not spelled out in the
legislative materials, are nonetheless clear. Improper use of insider
information by corporate insiders is most likely to occur in short-
term, in-and-out trading. The temptation to trade upon inside in-
formation is enhanced when the period for which the capital must
be committed is short. And ordinarily the useful life of "confiden-
tial" inside information is brief. The evidence upon which Con-
71 Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d at 345.
72 Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 792 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
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gress acted indicated that the abuse occurred almost entirely in
short-swing transactions. Moreover, few if any reasons could be
advanced for encouraging such trading by insiders. On the other
hand, in long-term investment the risk of abuse of inside informa-
tion was relatively slight, and the affirmative value of long-term
personal financial commitments by insiders to the prosperity of the
companies which they controlled was obviously great. Thus, by
basing forfeiture of profits upon the length of the insider's invest-
ment commitment, Congress sought to minimize misuse of con-
fidential information without unduly discouraging bona fide long-
term investment.73
The court's analysis is eminently correct in two important respects.
First, the court has clearly recognized the necessity for determining
this issue, in order to use the pragmatic method of interpretation in-
telligently. Second, the court has, it is submitted, correctly determined
the basic purposes underlying 16(b) and the types of practices
which were intended by the draftsmen to be prevented by it. The
court's conclusion that the section was intended to create a special
remedy applicable only with respect to certain insider transactions
and was not intended to provide a general remedy for all insider
abuses is both reasonable and consistent with legislative history.74
Under this analysis, the type of insider transaction intended to be
73 342 F.2d at 307-08 (emphasis added).
74 Short-swing speculative market activity by insiders was the principal abuse con-
sidered by Congress with regard to section 16.
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the subcom-
mittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers
of corporations who used their positions of trust and the confidential informa-
tion which came to them in such positions, to aid them in their market activities.
Closely allied to this type of abuse was the unscrupulous employment of inside
information by large stockholders who, while not directors and officers, exercised
sufficient control over the destinies of the companies to enable them to acquire
and profit by information not available to others.
S. RtP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934). Section 16 of the Exchange Act was drafted
to remedy these abuses.
The bill further aims to protect the interests of the public by preventing direc-
tors, officers and principal stockholders of a corporation, the stock of which is
traded in on exchanges from speculating in the stock on the basis of informa-
tion not available to others. Any change in the holdings of such insiders must
be reported to the Commission, and profits realized from the purchase and sale,
or the sale and purchase of an equity security within a period of less than 6
months are recoverable by the corporation. Such a provision wil render diffi-
cult or impossible the kinds of transactions which were frequently described to
the committee, where directors and large stockholders participated in pools trad-
ing in the stock of their own companies, with the benefit of advance informa-
tion regarding an increase or resumption of dividends in some cases, and the
passing of dividends in others.
S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934). That the scope of the 16(b) remedy should
be related to in-and-out trading activity has been indicated by several leading authors.
See 2 Loss 1059; Hamilton, supra note 22, at 1455-58, 1488-95; Feldman & Rubin, Stat-
utory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L.
REv. 468, 486 (1947).
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covered by section 16(b) is essentially an in-and-out trading transaction
in which the insider both acquires and disposes of the securities in
question within less than six months, usually through purchases and
sales in the public securities markets. Hence, any transaction by
an insider which amounts to short-swing in-and-out trading activity
should be interpreted as coming within the section, but any transaction
which does not have the effect of achieving this type of in-and-out trad-
ing should be interpreted as being beyond the purposes and scope of
16(b). If the courts will adopt this in-and-out trading interpretation of
the purpose and intended scope of the section as the principle under-
lying the pragmatic method of interpretation, they should experience
relatively less difficulty in interpreting 16(b) in future cases and there
should also be a significantly greater degree of predictability in the
decisions.
This interpretation, limiting the scope of 16(b) to speculative trad-
ing transactions, has been recognized to an extent in many of the cases
using the pragmatic method. But frequently the cases have failed to
be specific concerning the type of speculative transactions intended to be
covered by the section.7 r The conclusion that 16(b) was intended to
deal only with a specific type of insider abuse which gave the insider an
unfair advantage in trading in the public securities markets and was
not intended to remedy all abuses by insiders is further reinforced by
the fact that Congress in sections 9 and 10 of the Exchange Act dealt
separately and comprehensively with deceptive and manipulative
activity,76 and the fact that in other parts of section 16 Congress
related the scope of this specific section to speculative market trading
activity by insiders in the equity securities of their corporations. Both
the filing requirements in section 16(a) to disclose changes in owner-
ship and the limitations in 16(c) on certain types of trading activities
tend to relate primarily to speculative market activity of a short-term
nature.
Further support for the courts to adopt this approach to the
interpretation of 16(b) is supplied by the important developments in
the past decade under rule lOb-5 and the state law relating to corporate
insiders. It is quite clear today that the courts have found adequate
75 See, e.g., Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970); Petteys v. Butler,
367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d
507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342
(6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954). In each of these cases, the court recognizes that 16(b)
is intended to reach only profits by insiders from short-swing speculation. But the courts
do not further define this as in-and-out trading or equivalent market activity.
76 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j (1964).
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means in these resources to redress most insider abuses - particularly
those relating to abuse of corporate information. Hence, if the courts
in the early 16(b) cases felt impelled to construe it as broadly as
possible because there was little else in the law to prevent insider
abuse of corporate information, they should no longer feel that neces-
sity.
Finally, the third basic question outlined above should be con-
sidered. To what extent should the pragmatic method of interpreting
16(b), guided by the principle that the section is intended to relate
only to in-and-out trading activity by insiders, be used to interpret all
of the issues which may arise? Many of the cases which developed the
pragmatic interpretation concerned only whether particular transac-
tions came within the section's scope. It is submitted, however, that the
pragmatic method of interpretation should also apply to other issues
under 16(b), provided that this does not operate to complicate the
plaintiff's case unreasonably or to diminish the efficiency of the remedy
in proper cases. The deputization cases have demonstrated that a
more flexible method of interpretation can be effectively used to bring
within the short-swing profit recovery provisions those who actually
have the benefit of representation on the board of directors of the
corporate issuer. Similarly, transactions involving options created
within, but performed beyond the six-month period have been
effectively brought within 16(b) through the pragmatic interpretation,
where necessary to achieve the section's purposes. On the other hand,
16(b) expressly provides that it applies "irrespective of any intention
on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not
repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months."
Thus, the pragmatic method of interpretation clearly may not be used
to inject into the case any issue of the insider's subjective intent to
engage in a short-swing trading transaction.
There remain two possible issues under 16(b) to which the
pragmatic method of interpretation might be applied, but as yet has
not been. There is first the question of whether the courts should
allow the injection in 16(b) cases of any issue as to the defendant's
actual possession or use of inside information. It has been vigorously
argued that this should be allowed, at least as a defensive issue to the
limited extent of permitting the insider to prove that he was totally
without any inside information at the time of the transactions in
question 7 However, this would probably introduce substantial com-
77 See Munter, supra note 11.
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plications in the disposition of cases and might thus impede the effi-
ciency of the 16(b) remedy, inconsistently with the apparent legislative
intent.78 Second, the method for determining "profit realized" for 16(b)
purposes, adopted in Smolowe and Gratz and which has been followed
in innumerable subsequent cases, has long been considered excessively
harsh and has not yet been reconsidered under the pragmatic method
of interpretation. Under this method of determining profit realized,
it is entirely possible that the defendant may have realized actual
losses in the trading in question but still be liable to the issuer under
16(b) for a profit. Indeed, this occurred in Gratz,7 9 and it is submitted
that this is not necessary to achieve the true purposes of the section.
The origin of this method of determining profit realized is
found in Smolowe where the court applied the concept that securities
of the same class are fungible in order to squeeze all possible profits
out of short-swing speculative trading. In doing this, the court re-
jected three alternative methods of matching sales and purchases,
which were based on accounting and tax principles. Since the specific
term used in 16(b) is not profit but "profit realized," the three alter-
native approaches urged by the defendants were properly rejected by
the court. For the purposes of short-swing speculative trading, shares
of the same class of stock are indeed fungible. In order to deny cor-
porate insiders short-swing speculative profits, it is appropriate to
match sales and purchases without regard to the identification certifi-
cates, average values or the rule of first in, first out. However, the term
"profit realized" used in 16(b) should permit the interpretation that
losses actually realized by the insider during the period in question
should also be taken into consideration to reduce the profit realized
which is recoverable by the corporation. This approach must be dis-
tinguished from other concepts which have been suggested in the cases
which would allow the defendant to diminish his liability on the basis
of accrued but unrealized losses. The method suggested here would
allow the defendant, by affirmative pleading and proof, to diminish his
liability only to the extent that he has actually realized losses within
the period of the transactions giving rise to 16(b) liability. This would
allow the corporation to recover only the net profit actually realized
by the insider, but this amount would be determined by matching the
lowest purchase price with the highest sale price as the courts have
traditionally done.
78 See note 10 supra, reflecting the negative attitude of the draftsmen toward similar
issues. Cf. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943); 2 Loss 1040-44.
79 See note 18 supra,
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The four recent cases using the pragmatic interpretation dis-
cussed above should be considered briefly in the light of these sug-
gested principles of interpretation to determine whether the court
in each case has correctly discerned the essential purposes of 16(b) as
applied to the facts before the court. Under this approach, the decision
in Feder appears to be correct in its method of interpreting the
section, although there is obvious room for disagreement as to the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the case. In accepting
and applying the proposition that one corporation may be found to
be a "director" of another corporation for the purposes of 16(b)
through deputization, the court is effectively furthering the policies
underlying the section. The trading activity of the defendant Sperry
Rand was clearly in-and-out market trading within less than six months,
while its chief executive officer sat on the board of directors of Martin
Marietta. Thus, to construe 16(b) as including this insider in a transac-
tion clearly of the nature intended to be covered by the section is a
successful use of the pragmatic method of interpretation.
Similarly, the court in Bershad, in looking through the form of
the option transaction to determine that its substantive effect was to
enable the defendants to establish a fixed sale price within less than
six months of their purchase, although the option was not actually
exercised or closed until later, has effectively used the pragmatic inter-
pretation to reach a transaction essentially within its purposes. Un-
fortunately, the opinion in Abrams is not sufficiently clear to permit
an adequate evaluation. If the court is willing to look through the
form of the option transaction to determine that the date it was
granted is to be treated as the date of the defendant's sale, (if this is
the court's intent, and if the court is construing the option as certain to
be exercised from the outset), or is willing to match the purchase of one
security and the sale of an economically equivalent security for 16(b)
purposes, (if this is what the court has done), this may be an effective
use of the pragmatic method of interpretation. If, however, neither is
the case, and the court is in fact giving exaggerated emphasis to the
effect of the merger, its interpretation of 16(b) in this transaction is
more questionable.
It is submitted, however, that the court in Newmark has incorrectly
interpreted the applicability of 16(b) to the facts there presented. If
the essential purpose of the section is interpreted as relating to short-
swing in-and-out trading transactions by insiders which give rise to
speculative profits, it is clear that the transaction in the Newmark
case is entirely beyond the scope of section 16(b). In its determination
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of the "threshold question," the court has apparently concluded that
the purpose of the section is to redress every exercise of corporate con-
trol and any use of corporate information by an insider. It appears
that the merger itself, which the court necessarily treats as a "sale" for
16(b) purposes, did not actually result in any net change in RKO
General's ownership of the entire organization. A controlling majority
interest in one subsidiary was exchanged through the merger for
stock in another majority owned and controlled subsidiary which
the defendant continued to hold.
This clearly does not amount to a trading transaction within the
purpose and scope of 16(b). Thus, to apply the section to this trans-
action more nearly resembles an objective or literal interpretation of
its provisions than an effective use of the pragmatic method. Finally,
the court's willingness to add an additional 15 percent to the profits
recoverable as a control premium is obscure. Obviously, RKO General
was in control of the two corporations both before and after the merger.
However, it neither increased nor decreased its effective control, nor
realized any benefit from the sale of control, in the merger transaction.
The basis for adding this control premium to the profit realized by
RKO in the merger is therefore, unclear. For these reasons it appears
that Newmark represents an ostensible but incorrect use of the prag-
matic method of interpretation.
CONCLUSION
The pragmatic method of interpretation of section 16(b) has be-
come generally accepted, but, its underlying principles have not been
articulated with adequate precision to avoid confusion in the cases.
Most cases adopting the pragmatic method of interpretation have been
clear to the effect that 16(b) should be interpreted in the light of its
purposes; but, the cases have not been equally clear in discerning the
specific purposes intended to be served by the section. Thus, there has
been increased unpredictability in the decisions.
It seems clear that the essential purpose intended to be achieved
in section 16(b) was to prevent insiders from realizing speculative
profits through short-swing trading transactions in the equity securities
of their corporations with the unfair advantage of access to inside corpo-
rate information. This had been a substantial abuse prior to the enact-
ment of the section and was clearly in the minds of the draftsmen. The
purpose and scope of 16(b) should therefore be interpreted as involving
only this sort of short-swing in-and-out trading transaction and not
other types of transactions by insiders. This analysis of 16(b)'s pur-
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pose was best articulated by the Ninth Circuit in the Max Factor case.
If this principle is accepted as the rationale, the pragmatic method of
interpreting 16(b) can be more effectively used by the courts in a
variety of contexts with relatively greater predictability. Other types
of abuses by insiders can be better dealt with under the many other
aspects of the contemporary law relating to corporate insiders - par-
ticularly those evolving under rule lOb-5.
